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Multi-jurisdictional merger review procedures – a better way 
Julie Clarke*
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Corporate mergers are a worldwide phenomenon involving trillions of dollars1 and have the 
potential to significantly impact upon national economies.  For these reasons they are 
increasingly being regulated as more and more countries seek to control them through 
competition law regimes2 and the size of the mergers themselves invite multiple regulatory 
responses because they have an impact in more than one country.3
It is argued that this has led to a level of regulation that goes beyond what is required to 
protect national economies from undesirable merger activity.  The current level of 
regulation has significant implications for business,
 
 
4 regulators5 and, ultimately, the 
consumer & taxpaying public.6
                                            
*  Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University.  PhD Candidate, Queensland University of Technology.  This article is 
a condensed version of part of my PhD thesis.  I wish to thank Professor Stephen Corones for his helpful 
comments on an early draft of this paper.  Naturally, any errors and opinions throughout remain my own. 
1  The value of worldwide announced deals was estimated at US$3.46 trillion in 2000, ; US$1.7 trillion in 2001 and 
US$1.2 trillion in 2002 (being the lowest since 1994): Casey Cogut and Sean Rodgers, ‘Global Overview’ in 
Mergers & Acquisitions 2003 (4th ed, 2003) 3. 
2  68 Nations regulate mergers; 49 of them require pre-merger notification; (White & Case LLP, ‘White & Case 
Global Merger-Control Survey Finds Flood-Tide May Be Ebbing After Years on the Rise’ (Press Release 16 
January 2003). 
3  See, for example, Lise Davey and John K Barker, Competition Bureau Merger Review Benchmarking Report (28 
June 2001) 7.  See also International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report (28 February 2000) 2 
(‘ICPAC Report’). 
4  See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, A tax on mergers? Surveying the time and costs to business of multi-jurisdictional 
merger reviews (June 2003).  See also ICPAC Report, above n 3, 3 
5  See, for example, Davey & Barker, above n 3, 6.   
6  It is ironic that the public is subjected to unnecessary cost burdens, either through taxes to fund regulators or 
increased product prices, to facilitate regulation designed, at least in part, for their benefit. 
  Consequently, it is now more important than ever to ensure 
that the procedures employed to regulate these mergers are as efficient and consistent as 
possible.  
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The cost to business is now widely acknowledged and has been the subject of a recent 
detailed study.7  The cost to regulators, in time and resources, is also increasing and 
shows no signs of abating.  However, despite a broad acknowledgment of the 
inefficiencies and burdens associated with the current regulation of multi-jurisdictional 
mergers,8 and a general acceptance of the benefits likely to flow from a more harmonized 
system, little substantive action appears to have been taken to harmonize the regulation of 
mergers.9  The most recent attempt to promote harmonisation has come from the newly 
formed International Competition Network (ICN).  The ICN comprises a network of 
competition agencies, established in 200110 with a membership of 14 and with a current 
membership exceeding 70 states, as well as 3 supra-national bodies,11 whose purpose is 
to address ‘antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common interest’ and to formulate 
‘proposals for procedural and substantive convergence …’.12   Importantly, the ICN has 
placed at the forefront of its agenda the review of ‘merger control process in the multi-
jurisdictional context’,13
This paper will identify current deficiencies in the regulation of multijurisdictional mergers
 highlighting the increasing desire amongst the world’s competition 
regulators for increased convergence in this area.   
 
14
                                            
7  See, for example, J William Rowley and Mark Opashinov, ‘The internationalisation of merger review: towards 
global solutions’ in Merger Control 2003 (7th ed, 2003) 3.  See also PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 4 and J 
William Rowley and A. Neil Campbell, ‘A Comment on the Estimated Costs of Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Reviews’ 
(September 2003) The Antitrust Source 1-3. 
8  See, for example, Robert Paul, ‘The Increasing Maze of International Pre-Acquisition Notification’ (2000) 11 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 123.   
9  See, for example, Rowley and Opashinov, above n 7, 5 who note that ‘enormous gulf between talk and action’. 
10  The ICN was formed largely as a result of a recommendation by ICPAC (ICPAC Report, above n 3, 281). 
11  The Andean Community, EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Union. 
12  International Competition Network, Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the International 
Competition Network at <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mou.pdf> at 17 January 2005. 
13  Ibid. 
14  This review will be limited to the regulation of mergers through competition laws and will not address other forms 
of regulation, such as foreign investment or corporate laws.  It will also be restricted to multijurisdictional mergers; 
that is, mergers having competitive implications in more than one jurisdiction. 
 
and examine the proposals put forward by the ICN as well as making recommendations for 
further reform.  The first section will briefly discuss the current state of regulation for 
  Page 3 of 40 
The International Competition Network’s recommendations for multi-jurisdictional merger review procedures  
multijurisdictional mergers and the justification for pre-merger notification requirements.  
Key differences in existing merger law and processes will be identified to demonstrate the 
current divergent practices employed and the deficiencies inherent in the existing process 
of multijurisdictional merger review.15
The current regulation of multijurisdictional mergers 
    This will be followed by an examination of the 
ICN’s recommendations for reform in this area.  The final section will propose ways for 
further enhancing the multijurisdictional merger review process.  
Merger regulation is directed toward ensuring that a competitive economic environment is 
maintained in the relevant domestic economy.16  There is no supra-national body or treaty 
governing the way in which mergers having implications in more than one jurisdiction are 
to be regulated.  The regulation of mergers therefore remains subject to national laws with 
the result that mergers having implications transcending national borders will often be 
subjected to regulatory requirements in several jurisdictions.17  The extraterritorial reach of 
merger laws in most jurisdictions18 means that regardless of where the merger takes 
place, or the location of the merging parties, the requirements of all jurisdictions potentially 
affected by the merger need to be considered when proposing to merge.19    These 
requirements vary, often substantially, between jurisdictions.20
There are two distinct aspects to compliance with merger regimes.  The first involves 
substantive compliance; that is, ensuring the proposed merger will not infringe the 
substantive law defining which mergers may or may not take place.  The second is 
   
 
                                            
15  The focus is, therefore, on the cost of procedural (rather than substantive) compliance.   
16  See further, ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical Framework Sub-Group, The Analytical Framework for Merger 
Control, Final paper for the ICN annual conference <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/afsguk.pdf.> 
at 17 January 2005 and M. A. Utton, The Economics of Regulating Industry (1986), viii.   
17  A survey of 51 multinational companies over a period of approximately 18 months, found an average of eight 
merger reviews conducted per transaction: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 4, 6.  The 382 filings examined 
traversed 49 jurisdictions (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 14).  
18  Extraterritorial application of merger laws is not, at least in principal, particularly controversial, and, for purposes of 
this paper it will be accepted that some extraterritorial application is appropriate where a sufficient jurisdictional 
nexus can be established. 
19  See, for example, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 4, 15.   
20  See further, Michal S. Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies (2003) 199. 
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procedural and often requires parties to notify the relevant competition authority (or 
authorities) of a proposed merger where certain threshold tests are met, even where it is 
unlikely to be prohibited by the substantive law.  Often whether notification is required will 
depend entirely on the size of the transaction rather than its potential effects on 
competition.  While there will be, in many cases, a correlation between size and potential 
effect on competition, this is not invariably the case.  As a result, especially where the 
threshold level is low, many mergers unlikely to have an adverse effect on competition 
must nevertheless be notified, often in multiple jurisdictions.  Significant differences exist 
between merger regimes in both substantive law and procedural requirements.  It is, 
therefore, important to consider these further before examining the ICN’s best practice 
recommendations. 
 
The substantive regulation of mergers 
Mergers that lead to the creation of monopoly conditions are, subject to limited exceptions, 
universally condemned by jurisdictions that have adopted merger regimes.21  Beyond 
those extreme cases, however, debate rages over the extent to which mergers should be 
the subject of regulation and the degree to which factors other than reduction in 
competition or increased dominance, such as efficiencies, increased employment 
opportunities or the facilitation of international competitiveness, should be considered 
when determining whether to allow a merger to proceed. 22  Indeed, it is far from clear that 
there is any single jurisprudentially superior test applicable to all jurisdictions.23
                                            
21  See, for example, Utton, above n 16, 93. 
22  See further, Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978) and Utton, above n 16, 129.  For more on substantive 
merger laws see: OECD, Substantive Criteria Used for the Assessment of Mergers (2003), 
DAFFE/COMP(2003)5. 
23  See, for example, Gal, above n 20. Compare Richard Whish, ‘Substantive Analysis under the EC Merger 
Regulation: Should the Dominance Test Be Replaced by “Substantial Lessening of Competition”’ in J William 
Rowley (ed), International Merger Control: Prescriptions for Convergence (2001) 102. 
  As a result 
some regimes go further than others in preventing mergers which reduce competition but 
fall short of creating a monopoly.   The choice of substantive law may reflect different goals 
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of merger policy, different economic size, industrial advancement or geographic location24
Historically, key debate surrounding the introduction of merger laws has centred on 
whether to adopt a ‘substantial lessening of competition’ or a ‘market dominance’ test.  
The former prevents mergers that would result in a substantial lessening of competition in 
an identified market and has been adopted by a wide range of countries, including the 
United States,
 
- including the desire for regional consistency, as is the case amongst most European 
states.  
 
25 Canada, New Zealand,26 France, Ireland, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom.27   This test focuses on capturing the effects of both the ‘unilateral exercise of 
market power or implicit or explicit cooperative conduct.'28    The dominance test, on the 
other hand, generally prohibits mergers when they create or enhance a position of 
dominance in the identified market and has been used in the European Union (EU)29 and 
the majority of EU Member States including Switzerland, Hungary, Poland and Norway.30  
The dominance test is now often combined with a competition requirement so that a 
merger that tends to create or enhance a position of dominance will be prohibited only if it 
also leads to a reduction in competition.  To capture the situation where a merger might 
result in a duopoly or otherwise concentrated market, but does not give rise to single firm 
dominance, the concept of ‘joint dominance’ has also emerged in some jurisdictions to 
capture circumstances in which, post-merger, there is an increased likelihood of collusive 
conduct.31
                                            
24  See, for example, Gal, above n 20, 200-201.  
25  Clayton Act, 15 USC §18. 
26  Commerce Act 1986 (NZ) Parts 3 and 5.  New Zealand applied a dominance test until 2001 when it was changed 
to bring it into line with Australia’s merger law. 
27  Enterprise Act 2002 (UK) Part 3. 
28  Gal, above n 20, 206.  Gal claims this is more suitable for small economies because a larger percentage of 
mergers would tend to lead to or increase dominance. 
29  Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] 
OJ L 24/1, art 10(1).  This replaced Council Regulation 3864 of 1989 (EC) and took effect on 1 May 2004.  
30  Other EU States adopting the dominance test include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Italy and 
the Netherlands. 
31  See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy Theory and Practice (2004) 271. 
  In some jurisdictions additional tests relating to public benefits or efficiencies 
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also apply.32    In many jurisdictions efficiencies are also an important consideration in 
determining whether or not regulators will pursue a merger, even if this factor is not 
expressly written in to the substantive law.33
Despite the controversy surrounding which test is or is not the ‘best’ for reviewing multi-
jurisdictional mergers, statistics suggest that there is generally little difference in the 
outcome of merger reviews conducted in multiple jurisdictions that apply different tests.  
Nevertheless, the potential remains for divergent outcomes, evidenced by some high 
profile cases involving the US and EU authorities, which can lead to uncertainty for 
merging parties and can cause friction between States.
  There are a number of similar examples of 
modifications to traditional merger tests among the numerous countries that have now 
adopted merger regulations. 
 
34
Procedural regulation of mergers 
 
 
Procedural regulation of mergers is the area in which the most divergence currently exists.  
Jurisdictions may be conveniently divided into those that require notification prior to 
consummation of the merger and those that do not.   
 
Compulsory pre-merger notification 
The primary justification advanced for imposing a compulsory pre-merger notification 
requirement is to ensure that authorities have the opportunity to prevent conduct that could 
                                            
32  Efficiency is a factor considered when determining if a merger would lead to dominance or a substantial lessening 
of competition in many jurisdictions.  In Canada efficiency provides a defence so that a merger will not be 
prohibited if it can be demonstrated that there are efficiency benefits that would outweigh the detriments 
associated with the reduction in competition: s 96 of the Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34.  In Australia and 
New Zealand a merger may be authorised, despite substantially lessening competition, if the public benefits likely 
to flow from the merger will outweigh the potential anti-competitive detriment. 
33  See, for example, US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992, 
s 4. 
34  See, for example, Boeing/McDonnel Douglas, EC Case No. IV/M.877 (July 30, 1997) and General 
Electric/Honeywell EC Case No. COMP/M.2220 (3 July 2001) and ‘EU blocks GE/Honeywell deal’, BBC News, 3 
July 2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1420398.stm>.  See also ICPAC Report, above n 3, 52-56. 
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bring about significant and detrimental structural change to a market.35  Remedies of 
divestiture are available in most jurisdictions if a merger infringes substantive law, but the 
predominant view is that early detection and prevention of potentially anti-competitive 
mergers is to be preferred over subsequent efforts to ‘undo’ any harmful effects of the 
transaction through litigation.  This is because, unlike other forms of anti-competitive 
conduct commonly regulated, such as price fixing, boycotts or exclusive dealing, mergers 
bring about structural change within the affected market or markets which will be difficult to 
correct should anti-competitive concerns later arise.36
A recent survey concluded that there are now 68 nations that regulate mergers, 49 of 
which require pre-merger notification.
  Perhaps more significantly, 
mergers, unlike most other forms of anti-competitive conduct, are able to be regulated in 
this way because they are necessarily very public ventures.   
 
37   The procedural requirements in these 
jurisdictions – in particular, thresholds for notification (including the method of 
measurement used to determine whether a threshold has been met), timing for notification 
and review and informational requirements, often vary considerably. 38
                                            
35  See, for example, Joe Sims and Deborah P Herman, ‘Twenty Years Of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger Enforcement: 
The Effect Of Twenty Years Of Hart-Scott-Rodino On Merger Practice: A Case Study In The Law Of Unintended 
Consequences Applied To Antitrust Legislation’ (1997) 65 Antitrust LJ 865. 
36  See, for example, Commonwealth, Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies: Profiting from Competition, Report of the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, May 1989, p 22 (The Griffiths 
Report).  Compare Sims & Herman, above n 35. 
37  White & Case, above n 2.  This number is likely to continue to increase. 
38  Working Group Comment 1 (September 2002) to Recommendation III(B), International Competition Network, 
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mnprecpractices.pdf> at 20 January 2005 (‘ICN, Recommended 
Practices’). 
  The variation in 
filing fees imposed is also significant.  These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the 
threshold timelines and often methods of review are constantly changing within a number 
of jurisdictions so that there can be great difficulty in obtaining current information. 
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No compulsory pre-merger notification 
Many of the countries that do not require pre-merger notification have in place procedures 
for the voluntary notification of mergers prior to completion.  Australia, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom are amongst only a handful of jurisdictions that have adopted a 
voluntary notification regime.39    Despite the voluntary nature of notification in these 
jurisdictions, the vast majority of significant mergers are notified by the parties for 
clearance before the parties proceed.40
The need for action 
  The authorities also invariably initiate investigate 
of potentially troublesome mergers regardless of notification by the parties.   Thus, while 
less formal than the jurisdictions imposing compulsory notification requirements, pre-
merger notification is effectively the norm in both Australia and New Zealand.   
The process of examining mergers prior to completion emerged when only a handful of 
jurisdictions had merger laws and there was limited, if any, cross-border activity.  Today 
there are literally dozens of countries requiring pre-merger notification and more 
considering the introduction of such systems.41
Combined with a climate in which trans-national business activity has become the norm, 
the result is a regulatory jungle for business and a burdensome workload for competition 
  In addition there are voluntary systems of 
notification almost always adopted by the parties and numerous other jurisdictions which 
regulate mergers without the need for pre-merger notification, but to whose substantive 
laws parties must still adhere.     
 
                                            
39  In 1992 the Cooney Committee recommended a mandatory pre-notification scheme be introduced in Australia, but 
the recommendation never came to fruition (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Mergers, Monopolies and Acquisitions: Adequacy of Existing Legislative Controls (1991) recommendations 5&6,  
pp xiv; 55-76.  A more recent inquiry into Australia’s competition law regime found no support for the introduction 
of a mandatory notification system of merger notification and none was recommended: Trade Practices Act 
Review Committee, Review of the Competition Law Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (2003), 60-61 (‘Dawson 
Report’).   
40  See, for example Stephen Corones, ‘The Strategic Approach to Merger Enforcement by the ACCC’ (1998) 26 
ABLR 64, 67 and ACCC, The ACCC's Approach to Mergers: A statistical summary (1998) 27. 
41  For example, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam: John Mollard, Competition Laws Promote Economic 
Development (2005) International Financial Law Review 
<http://www.legalmediagroup.com/iflr/default.asp?Page=1&SID=5218&F=F> at 20 January 2005.  
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authorities.   This current process for the multi-jurisdictional review of mergers is in need of 
substantial reform.  The burdens associated with procedural compliance in multiple 
jurisdictions have triggered numerous calls for increased convergence, cooperation and 
clearer and more realistic nexus requirements.  Still, no international system exists for the 
review of trans-national mergers, save a hotch-potch of relatively vague bilateral treaties, 
informal co-operation arrangements and best practices ‘recommendations’.   
 
It is, however, legitimate to expect parties to comply with a number of different substantive 
laws.  In this respect, while there have been calls for greater substantive harmony in 
merger legislation, it is rarely suggested that complying with substantive law in multiple 
jurisdictions is an unreasonable or unnecessary burden for companies42
(1)  to ensure that only those mergers having a real possibility of raising competition 
concerns are subjected to the procedural requirements;  
 and it is generally 
not the issue of greatest concern to the parties.  It is, on the other hand, less obvious that 
jurisdictions should seek to impose, extraterritorially, cumbersome procedural 
requirements on merging parties – at least to the degree to which this presently occurs.   
The cost – and, perhaps more importantly, the time burden – expended in complying with 
multiple procedural regimes is excessive.   
 
It is not, however, suggested that mandatory pre-merger notification should be abandoned.  
While there is a case to be made for its elimination or replacement with a set of voluntary 
systems which would allow parties to focus their attention on substantive compliance, it is 
accepted at this stage that there is there is little or no prospect of this occurring.  Thus, 
attention should turn to ways in which the current mandatory regimes can be significantly 
improved in the short term.  In particular, it is suggested that reform is needed  
 
                                            
42  See, however, Whish, above n 23,101-102. 
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(2)  to ensure that those that are subject to the procedural requirements of a 
notification regime, that these are no more burdensome than is necessary to 
determine whether the proposed merger infringes the substantive law; and  
 
(3)  to promote consistency wherever possible between jurisdictions with pre-merger 
notification regimes, particularly in terms of initial notification requirements.   
 
In all these areas the current ‘system’ fails.  
 
A large part of the problem can be attributed to low threshold requirements for notification.  
However, even where multi-jurisdictional review is appropriate because the size or nature 
of the merger is such that there is the possibility it could contravene the substantive law of 
multiple states, the differing, and often excessively onerous, procedural requirements 
impose significant burdens on the parties.  A recent study concluded that a typical multi-
jurisdictional merger review required filing in 5.6 jurisdictions with an additional 2.2 
jurisdictions considered43 at an average combined external cost of Aus$5.6m.44  Costs 
were made up of 65% legal fees, 19% filing fees and 14% fees for advisors.  Not 
surprisingly, the more complex the deal was, the higher the cost.45  However, even for 
mergers subject to only initial stages of review, the average external costs (comprising 
mostly legal fees) have been estimated at Aus$931,00046
                                            
43  PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 4, 15. 
44  Ibid, 4.  The estimate was made in Euro currency (€3.3m).  Conversion to Australian dollars is accurate as at 20 
January 2005. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid.  The figure was listed as €545,000. Australian currency conversion was performed on 10 January 2005. 
 with an average length of 5 
months to complete.  In addition to the external costs, average internal costs of 
compliance have been estimated at 28 person-weeks where only initial reviews are 
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conducted or 120 person weeks where in-depth reviews are involved.47   Added to the cost 
of notification itself is the cost associated with delaying the transaction,48 for both the 
parties and for consumers and business who may be deprived of the benefits associated 
with increased efficiency, such as cost savings or increased quality products.   Where only 
an initial review is conducted the average duration for the review of a transaction is 
estimated at five months; this rises to nine months when in-depth review is conducted.49
The ICN Recommendations 
  
 
In addition to business costs, there are also significant burdens imposed on regulators in 
terms of time and resources, funded either by the parties, through high filing fees, or by the 
taxpaying public generally.  It is not surprising, therefore, that various calls for reform have 
been made and continue in the area of multi-jurisdictional merger review. 
 
In the past decade various proposals have been put forward for both procedural and 
substantive harmonisation in multijurisdictional mergers.50
                                            
47  Ibid 4.  The study also concluded that ‘for initial reviews a doubling of the number of reviews (merger jurisdictions) 
leads to a doubling of external costs’ for which there are no economies of scale.  See also Eleanor M. Fox and 
Merit E. Janow, A Report of the Second Annual Conference of the International Competition Network (2003) 
International Competition Network 13 < http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/merida_report_2003.pdf > 
at 20 January 2005. 
48  Simon J Evenett, ‘How Much Have Merger Review Laws Reduced Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions?’ in J 
William Rowley (ed), International Merger Control: Prescriptions for Convergence (2001) 39.  See also Davey & 
Barker, above n 3, 96. 
49  PriceWaterHouseCoopers, above n 4, 29. 
50  See, for example, Richard Whish and Diane Wood, Merger Cases in the Real World: A Study of Merger Control 
Procedures (OECD, 1994) 12, OECD, Report on Notification of Transnational Mergers (1999) 
DAFFE/CLP(99)2/FINAL, 4, BIAC & ICC, Recommended Framework for Best Practices in International Merger 
Control Procedures (2001) and ICPAC Report, above n 3, 5. 
  The focus, at least at 
government level, has been on limited ‘soft’ harmonization through best practice 
recommendations or increased cooperation between nations.  Calls for more substantive 
action, such as establishing ‘common’ filing forms for multi-jurisdicitonal mergers or the 
negotiation of multi-lateral treaty governing the regulation of such mergers have been 
ignored or rejected. 
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The International Competition Network (ICN) is the most recent international body to make 
recommendations for change in the way international mergers are regulated.  The ICN 
was formed in 2001 and comprises competition law officials from around the globe, 
currently numbering more than 70 states as well as the Andean Community, European 
Union and EFTA Surveillance Authority. 51  The creation of the ICN has provided a unique 
opportunity to promote reform in merger review.  Regulators, in many cases, have both the 
ability and the inclination to affect real change in domestic competition law and policy.52  
While the ICN plans to address all areas of competition policy and enforcement, the 
importance regulators attach to reform of the multi-jurisdictional merger review process is 
highlighted by the placing of this issue at the forefront of the ICN’s agenda for 
discussion.53  This has resulted in the development and adoption of ‘Eight Guiding 
Principles’ for merger notification and review,54 and a set of Recommended Practices for 
Merger Review (‘Recommended Practices’), which have developed and expanded since 
the ICN’s first annual conference in September 2002. It is expected that development and 
implementation will continue throughout 2006 and beyond.55
                                            
51  See above n 10.  Figures current to 17 January 2005. 
52  See White & Case, above n 2.  
53  ICN, Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the International Competition Network (2001). 
54  ICN, Guiding Principles for Merger Notification and Review 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/icnnpguidingprin.htm> at 20 January 2005 (Guiding Principles).   
55  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38.  The first three recommended practices were adopted at eh ICN’s first 
conference in September 2002 and have been progressively updated.  Following adoption of the latest set of 
recommendations at the 2005 conference, the recommendations now number 13.  
  The recommendations are, 
however, non-binding and governments and agencies may or may not implement them as 
they choose.   
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Guiding principles and recommendations 
The ICN Mergers Working Group56
I. Nexus to reviewing jurisdiction;
 (‘Working Group) formulated the following eight 
Guiding Principles for Merger Notification and Review (‘Guiding Principles’), which were 
adopted at the ICN’s first annual conference in 2002: sovereignty, transparency, non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality, procedural fairness, efficient, timely and effective 
review, coordination, convergence and protection of confidential information.  These 
Guiding Principles, despite being relatively benign, provide an appropriate framework for 
the development of more substantive moves toward the harmonisation of merger laws.  In 
particular, the seventh guiding principle, ‘convergence’, calls for work toward the 
‘convergence of merger processes toward agreed best practices’.  This is currently being 
facilitated by the development and adoption of a series of recommended practices.  The 
existing Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures are grouped into 
thirteen key areas: 
 
57
II. Notification thresholds;
 
58
III. Timing of notification;
 
59
IV. Review periods;
 
60
V. Requirements for initial notification;
 
61
VI. Conduct of merger investigations;
 
62
VII. Procedural Fairness;
 
63
                                            
56  The Mergers Working Group consists of three sub-groups.  The relevant sub-group for purposes of this paper is 
the Merger Notification and Procedures subgroup.   This group will be referred to throughout as the ‘Working 
Group’. 
57  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation I. 
58  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation II. 
59  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation III. 
60  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IV. 
61  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation V. 
62  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI (originally recommendation VIII).  Note that 
following the 2004 ICN Conference, the recommended practices have been re-ordered.  To avoid confusion 
references have been included, where applicable, to the pre-2004 number order as well as the current order. 
63  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IX. 
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VIII. Transparency;64
IX. Confidentiality;
 
65
X. Interagency Coordination;
 
66
XI. Remedies;
  
67
XII. Competition Agency Powers;
 
68
XIII. Review of merger control provisions.
 and 
69
 
 
These have developed progressively over the first four annual conferences of the ICN, 
held in Italy,70 Mexico,71 Korea72 and Germany73 respectively.  The focus is now likely to 
shift from creating new recommendations to their implementation.74
Jurisdictional nexus 
 
The first of the recommended practices concerns the nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction.  
After observing that jurisdictions are sovereign in relation to the application of their merger 
laws, the recommendation calls for jurisdictions to ensure they apply an appropriate ‘local 
nexus’ requirement, sufficient to eliminate transactions unlikely to have any significant 
effect on local competition.75
                                            
64  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VIII (originally recommendation VI).  
65  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IX. 
66  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation X. 
67  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XI. 
68  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XII. 
69  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XIII (previously recommendation XI and originally 
recommendation VII). 
70  The first three of these recommendations were presented and officially adopted at the first conference of the ICN in Italy, 
September 2002: Eleanor M Fox, A Report on the First Annual Conference of the International Competition 
Network, (2002) International Competition Network 10  
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/news/dec102002.doc> at 21 January 2005. 
71  recommendations IV, V, VII and XIII were adopted at the ICN’s second conference in Mexico in 2003: See Fox and Janow, 
above n 47, 39.  Note, these were originally numbered recommendations IV to VII but have since been re-
ordered: see above n 85. 
72  Recommendations VI, VIII, IX and X were adopted at the ICN’s third conference in Korea in 2004.   
73  Recommendations XI and XII were adopted at the fourth conference of the ICN held in Germany in June 2005. 
74  A Statement of Mission and Achievements Up Until May-2005, (2005) International Competition Network 13 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/bonn/Work_Plans/achievements/ICN_Mission_and_Achievemen
ts_Statement.pdf> at 11 July 2005.  See also International Competition Network, Merger Working Group, 
Notification and Procedures Subgroup 2005-2006 Work Plan at 3. 
75  See ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation I. 
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It is arguable that this recommendation adds little or nothing to prevailing theories of 
international law which require that there be some jurisdictional or national connection 
before domestic laws and regulations are invoked on foreign parties.  Nevertheless, given 
that corporate mergers often involve companies with assets or dealings in multiple 
jurisdictions, the technical ‘connection’ required by international law may frequently be met 
despite little or no prospect of a merger affecting local competition in any appreciable way.  
As a consequence, the recommendation seeks to go beyond international law restrictions 
on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and also restrict the application of laws to 
mergers which, while having some ‘national’ connection, local dealing or economic effect, 
do not have a sufficiently strong ‘nexus’ to merit a costly investigation.   
 
The recommendation would be more potent, however, if it dealt with both overall 
thresholds (applicable to both domestic & foreign mergers) and jurisdictional nexus 
requirements.  Instead it is restricted the latter.  The general consensus is that thresholds 
are currently far too low in most jurisdictions,76 evidenced by the fact that the vast majority 
of mergers currently required to be notified, whether domestic or foreign, pass through the 
merger clearance processes unscathed.77  For example, in the United States, more than 
97% of notifiable mergers do not raise serious concerns for review authorities.  In addition 
to the costs incurred by business in preparing and filing multiple notifications, low 
thresholds have also resulted, in recent years, in booming costs to many regulators which 
has seen a number of jurisdictions adopting for the first time, or increasing, fees for review 
of mergers in an endeavour to fund the system.78
                                            
76  For example, in the US more only approximately 2.4% of the thousands of mergers notified each year receive 
requests for stage 2 reviews (based on 1998-2001 statistics): Mergers Control 2003, above n 7, 12. 
77  Often the figure in OECD countries is above 95%.  See further, Davey and Barker, above n 3, 8. 
78  For example, Canada introduced fees for pre-merger notification in November 1997: Davey and Barker, above n 
3, 11. 
  A best practices agreement designed to 
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ensure parties work toward ensuring their thresholds are maintained at a reasonable level 
could, at least over time, facilitate the lowering of thresholds to a more desirable level.79
Despite the focus on nexus requirements, this ICN recommendation could, potentially, go 
some way to achieving more realistic thresholds.  In particular, a working group comment 
to this recommendation states that notification ‘should not be required unless the 
transaction is likely to have a significant, direct and immediate economic effect within the 
jurisdiction concerned’ (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, as a result of the vague terms in 
which the recommendation is expressed, it is clear that jurisdictional nexus might be easily 
established in accordance with this recommendation despite little prospect of a merger 
having serious competitive effects. This is exemplified by the US’ claimed adherence 
despite being widely regarded has having unrealistically low thresholds for notification.
   
 
80
Notification thresholds 
  
The final problem with the recommendation is the lack of guidance as to what constitutes 
an ‘appropriate’ threshold.  While it is appropriate that no specific financial or other 
threshold be set and made applicable to all jurisdictions, more guidance as to what was 
intended by ‘appropriate’ might have provided more pressure on authorities to review 
existing jurisdictional thresholds. 
 
The second set of recommendations adopted by the ICN relate to the criteria upon which 
notifiability is determined, rather than the level of the thresholds themselves.  In particular, 
they recommend that notification thresholds be: 
                                            
79  See further, ICPAC Report, above n 3, 4.  See also Davey and Barker, above n 3, 123. 
80  A survey commissioned by the Merger Streamlining Group (Comprised of Alcan Inc, British Telecom, Charles 
River Associates, Compaq Computer Corporation, General Electric Company, Gldman Sachs International, 
NERA, Rio Tinto plc and Vodephone Group and assisted by Janet McDavid, Phillip Proger, Michael Reynolds, J 
William Rowley QC and Neil Campbell) concluded that, while none of the 46 respondent jurisdictions were 
inconsistent with the first recommendation, 28 were only partially consistent and only 18 substantially consistent.  
see J William Rowley and A Neil Campbell, ‘Implementation of the International Competition Network’s 
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures: Final Report’ (2004) 5 Business Law International 
110.  
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 clear and understandable81
 based on objectively quantifiable criteria;
 
82
 based on information that is readily accessible to the merging parties.
 and 
83
 
   
The first of these recommendations is straight-forward and uncontroversial.  In terms of 
objectively quantifiable criteria, the recommendation is designed to eliminate the use of 
criteria such as ‘market share’ or an assessment of the potential effects of the merger, 
which are inherently subjective. Turnover, on the other hand, is a commonly used 
determinant which would conform with this recommendation.84  While most jurisdictions 
already apply an objective criteria for purposes of determining notification, several 
jurisdictions, such as, Russia, Portugal, Thailand, Taiwan and Brazil, continue to require 
analysis of subjective issues either in order to assess notifiability or as part of the 
notification requirements.85
                                            
81  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation II(A). The Working Group comments that an 
essential feature of notification thresholds should be ‘clarity and simplicity’: Working Group comment 1 to 
recommendation II(A).   
82  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation II(B).   
83  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation II(C). 
84  The working group also suggests that jurisdictions ‘seek to adopt uniform definitions or guidelines with respect to 
commonly used criteria’ such as thresholds, to increase consistency: ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, 
Working Group comment 3 to recommendation II(B).   
85  For example, some countries require assessment of subjective criteria such as acquisition of decisive influence, 
compared with more traditional objective criteria like the value of shares or assets: OECD, Report on Notification 
of Transnational Mergers, above n 50, 3.  A recent study shows that at least 27 of 53 jurisdictions examined use 
subjective criteria for notification thresholds, mainly relating to market share and/or market power: Implementation 
of the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notifciation and Review Procedures, April 2005, Annex B, 2 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/bonn/Mergers_WG/SG1_Notification_Procedures/Implementatio
n.pdf> at 12 July 2005. 
  It is in the interest of both parties and regulators concerned 
that threshold determinants be both clear and objectively quantifiable so that parties can 
accurately identify the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which they are required to comply with 
procedural notification requirements.   
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Finally, it is recommended that thresholds be ‘based on information that is readily 
accessible to the merging parties’, meaning available in the ordinary course of business,86 
subject to the proviso that it is reasonable to require parties to ‘report their assets by 
jurisdiction even if they do not maintain data in that form in the ordinary course of 
business.’87
Timing of Notification 
  Such information will invariably be sufficient to determine whether further 
investigation of a proposal is warranted. 
 
These are all sensible and important recommendations which, if adhered to, should reduce 
the burden of notification, at least in some cases.  It is, therefore, not surprising that they 
have also appeared in previous calls for convergence.   
 
 
Different tests are currently employed for determining when parties may, or must, notify 
authorities of a proposed merger.88  While some jurisdictions do not impose any deadlines 
for notifications, others impose minimum deadlines based on a variety of tests relating to 
how far progressed merger negotiations are89 and/or maximum deadlines as short a seven 
days from the signing of an agreement.90  Until recently even the EU imposed a maximum 
deadline of only seven days from the conclusion of agreement, announcement of public 
bid or acquisition of control.91
                                            
86  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation II(C).   
87  See also ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to Recommendation II(C). 
88  See, for example, ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group Comment 1 to recommendation 
III(A) and ICPAC Report, above n 3, 11.  
89  For example ‘good faith intent’ or ‘first signed document’. 
90  This is the case in Poland: Act on Protection of Competition and Consumers of December 15, 2000, Article 94.4. 
91  This deadline has now been eliminated: Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
 In addition to affecting the ability of parties to file notifications 
in multiple jurisdictions concurrently, the short time frames imposed by some jurisdictions 
can cause unnecessary strain on parties.   
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In response, the third set of ICN recommendations provides that notifications should be 
permitted any time after the parties certify a ‘good faith intent to consummate the proposed 
transaction’92 and that there should be no ‘maximum’ deadlines imposed on parties 
required to notify a transaction where closing is prohibited until the notification has been 
reviewed.93  Even where closing is not prohibited parties should allow a ‘reasonable time’ 
to file ‘following a clearly defined triggering event’.94  This is based on the view that parties 
wishing to merge have an incentive to file quickly after agreement in any event.95
These are all commendable recommendations seeking to correct an area of significant 
inconsistency
  In this 
respect, parties have evidenced a preference to withhold closure until clearance is granted 
to avoid the possibility of greater penalties, including divestiture, if the merger is 
subsequently challenged.  
 
96 and should help to facilitate the coordination of filing in multiple 
jurisdictions.97
Review Periods 
  The European Union has already amended its notification timing 
requirements to conform with these recommendations.   
 
The time taken for review has frequently been cited as the most important concern facing 
merging parties,98
                                            
92  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation III(A). 
93  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation III(B). 
94  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation III(C). 
95  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation III(B). 
96  A recent survey found that of 46 ICN members responding, 37% were substantially consistent with 
recommendation III, 54% were only partially consistent and 9% were inconsistent: Rowley and Campbell, above n 
80, 118.  See also Fox and Janow, above n 62, 33. 
97  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation III(A). 
98  Davey and Barker, above n 3, 34. 
 even ahead of the quality of the response, lower fees and less 
burdensome filing requirements.  This is because lengthy review periods necessarily delay 
time-sensitive mergers and as a result may jeapardise the merger.  The delay caused by 
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review periods is particularly acute where review takes place in multiple jurisdictions and a 
long drawn-out process in only one jurisdiction can effectively delay a transaction for 
months.   
 
The working group has recognised these delays may ‘jeopardize the consummation of the 
transaction’, ‘have an adverse impact on the merging parties’ individual transition planning 
efforts’ and business operations and, most importantly from the public’s perspective, may 
defer ‘realization of any efficiencies arising from the transaction’.99  They also note the 
dichotomy that exists between the needs of the authorities to have sufficient time to 
investigate mergers where ‘complex legal and economic issues’ arise and the needs of the 
parties to complete time sensitive mergers within a reasonable time.  Consequently, this is 
clearly one of the more difficult areas in which to achieve consensus. In particular, it is 
unlikely that a formally agreed ‘maximum time frame’, applicable to all mergers, could be 
negotiated and, for various reasons, this may not be desirable.100
The ICN has, therefore, made the modest recommendation that all merger reviews ‘should 
be completed within a reasonable period of time’
  
 
101
‘incorporate procedures that provide for expedited review and clearance of notified 
transactions that do not raise material competitive concerns.’
 and that review systems should – 
 
102
In this respect it is also recommended that there should be a specified initial period of 
review,
   
 
103 which the working group suggests be no longer than six weeks.104
                                            
99  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation IV(A). 
100  Different substantive law and methods of analysis applied in regulating jurisdictions might require at least slightly 
different time frames; variations in resource capabilities might also necessitate different time frames and there 
might be special circumstances requiring flexibility.   
101  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IV(A). 
102  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IV(B). 
103  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendations IV(C) and (D). 
  Many 
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jurisdictions already make provision for an initial phase of investigation aimed at 
eliminating those mergers unlikely to raise competition concerns.105  If more widely 
adopted, these recommendations would result in a ‘definitive and readily-ascertainable’106
For those mergers requiring further scrutiny, the ICN recommends a determinable time 
frame for any extended waiting periods.
 
initial review period which could either result in the expedited clearance of harmless 
mergers or early notice to parties that their merger will be subjected to more detailed 
scrutiny. 
 
107   While not seeking to impose a set review 
period, the working group suggests that extended stage 2 reviews should ‘be completed or 
capable of completion within six months or less following the submission of the initial 
notification(s)’ (emphasis added).108   The reference to ‘capable of completion’ refers 
predominantly to the interruption that occurs when information provided is deemed 
incomplete or further requests for information come from the reviewing agency, which 
account for the majority of delays in numerous jurisdictions, perhaps most notably, the 
United States.109  While there is no formal recommendation relating to delays caused by 
requests for further information, the working group has stated agencies should notify 
parties in a timely fashion of ‘any deficiencies in their submission’ and provide specific 
details of any such deficiency so that parties can promptly correct their filing.110
                                                                                                                                                 
104  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation IV(C). 
105  See ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comments 1 and 2 to recommendation IV(B).  
See also Implementation of the ICN Recommended Practices, above n 85, Annex B, 3.  Currently most 
jurisdictions with initial review periods adopted a time frame of around 30 days or a month. 
106  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation IV(C). 
107  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendations IV(C) and (D). 
108  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation IV(C). 
109  In Australia, for example, the new Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Guideline for Informal 
Merger Review (September 2004), 5, states that the circumstances which will cause ‘the clock to be stopped’ on 
merger review include: ‘the provision of incomplete information or the ACCC’s need for additional information from 
the parties.’  
110  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 3 to recommendation IV(C). 
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The working group also observed that in some complex cases additional time may be 
required by the agencies to reach a determination,111 and that, therefore, limited 
exceptions should be permitted if such extension might ‘avoid a more protracted, formal 
extension of the waiting period and/or an adverse enforcement decision.’ 112
Requirements for initial notification 
 
 
 
The fourth set of recommendations focus on the information required to be provided if the 
threshold levels for notification have been met.  Given that an extremely high percentage 
of mergers reviewed are cleared at the initial stages it is important that the information 
burdens imposed on parties required to notify at this stage are as small as possible so that 
no undue burden is imposed upon parties whose merger poses little or no threat to the 
competitive process.   
 
The key recommendation in this respect is that authorities should limit notification 
requirements to:  
 
‘information needed to verify that the transaction exceeds jurisdictional thresholds, 
to determine whether the transaction raises competitive issues meriting further 
investigation, and to take steps necessary to terminate the review of transactions 
that do not merit further investigation.’113
                                            
111  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 6 to recommendation IV(C). 
112  Ibid.  See also ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IV(E).  
113  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation V(A). 
   
 
In particular, as the working group commented:  
 
  Page 23 of 40 
The International Competition Network’s recommendations for multi-jurisdictional merger review procedures  
‘the initial notification should elicit the minimum amount of information necessary to 
initiate the merger review process.’114
In addition, practices should be implemented to ‘avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on 
parties to transactions that do not present material competitive concerns.’
 
 
115  In this 
respect jurisdictions should permit flexibility in the content of initial notifications and 
reviews116 to cater for the diverse range of transactions likely to be notified.  This might be 
accomplished by, for example, providing alternative notification formats (such as long and 
short form options117) and discretionary waivers in relation to information not relevant in a 
particular case.118  Authorities should also ‘consider’ accepting information that provides 
substantially the information they require even if not in the precise format requested, 
where parties have used the alternate format for submission in other jurisdictions.119  In 
addition, they should be able to waive information requirements during pre-merger 
consultations where the ‘burden of compiling and submitting the information’ would 
outweigh its value to the authorities.120   Conversely, parties be allowed to submit 
additional information where it may assist in early resolution.121  Authorities should also 
provide guidance to parties on notifiability of transactions and content of a notification 
where requested by the parties.122
Finally, it is recommended that jurisdictions ‘limit translation requirements and formal 
authentication burdens’ in the initial notification stage.
 
 
123
                                            
114  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation V(A). 
115  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation V(B). 
116  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation V(B). 
117  These options have already been adopted in some jurisdictions: see, for example, Canada. 
118  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation V(B).   
119  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 5 to recommendation V(B). 
120  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation V(C). 
121  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 6 to recommendation V(B). 
122  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation V(C). 
123  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation V(D).  At least 20 jurisdictions of the 53 recently 
examined in an ICN project require all supporting documents to be fully translated: Implementation of the ICN 
Recommended Practices, above n 85, Annex B, 5. 
  While the notification itself could 
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appropriately be required to be in the official language of the relevant jurisdiction, 
supporting documents – at least at initial stages - should not be required to be translated 
provided summaries and important excerpts are translated.  Translation currently imposes 
a significant time and financial burden for many multi-jurisdictional merger notifications and 
this recommendation will, therefore, prove valuable if implemented. 
 
Transparency 
The next key set of recommendations relate to transparency; in particular, it is 
recommended that merger laws be applied ‘with a high level of transparency’ subject to 
appropriate confidentiality requirements124
‘the jurisdictional scope of the merger control law, the competition agency’s 
decision-making procedures, and the principles and criteria the competition agency 
uses to apply the substantive review standard.’
 and that that merger control regimes be 
transparent with respect to  
 
125
The working group notes that transparency of this nature is ‘important to achieve 
consistency, predictability and, ultimately, fairness in applying merger control laws …’.
   
 
126  
An important element of transparency is ensuring laws, regulations, policy and other key 
materials127 are made available to the public in a timely manner.128  The working group 
envisages not only the publication of substantive law and procedural requirements,129
                                            
124  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VIII(A) (originally recommendation VI). 
125  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VIII(B). 
126  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation VIII(A). 
127  See ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 3 to recommendation VIII(B). 
128  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation VIII(A).  This is 
expanded on in recommendation VIII(C) which calls for authorities to make available to the public information 
relating to the ‘current state of merger control law, policy, and practice’. 
129  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to Recommendation VIII(C). 
 but 
also the issue of press releases on important decisions, delivering and publishing 
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speeches and issuing statements signifying any change in enforcement policy, as well as 
general guidelines.130
A number of jurisdictions now have guidelines or other notices providing parties with 
information on the procedural and substantive requirements of their merger regulation.  
Many also release speeches and other publications.  In many cases wider information has 
been provided in response to the ICN’s recommendations.
    
 
131   Much of this information is 
now freely available online, either through dedicated domestic websites or on the ICN’s 
own website which hosts information pages and ‘template’ documents on a large number 
of ICN members’ merger regimes.132
‘reasoned explanation should be provided for decisions to challenge, block or 
condition the clearance of a transaction, and for clearance decisions that set a 
precedent or represent a shift in enforcement policy or practice.’
  In addition, the Global Competition Network, 
established by the International Bar Association, also provides free online information 
about the merger laws in numerous jurisdictions.   
 
In relation to the provision of information on important decisions, the working group 
recommends that a  
 
133
Currently, few jurisdictions provide detailed explanations for decisions, other than in cases 
where mergers are challenged.
   
 
134
                                            
130  See further ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 3 to recommendation VIII(C). 
131  See, for example, ACCC, ‘Revised processes proposed for informal merger reviews’, News Release, 23 
September 2004.  
132  The ICN’s ‘Merger Review Laws, Related Materials, and Templates’ web page contains ICN ‘Merger Notification 
and Procedures Template’ for more than 60 jurisdictions. 
133  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation VIII(C). 
134  The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee cited Australia as an example of a country in which this 
did occur.  See ACCC, ‘Revised processes proposed for informal merger reviews’, News Release, 23 September 
2004.   
   Reasoned explanations in the circumstances 
suggested by the working group might prove valuable in establishing a body of precedent 
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to guide parties as to the type of concerns held by the various authorities.  Anything more 
substantial would threaten to slow down the entire process and increase the time-delays 
so abhorred by merging parties. 
 
In the relatively recent past there was little transparency in the regulation of mergers in 
many jurisdictions.135   While this has now improved significantly, there is still clear scope 
for improvement.136
Conduct of Merger Investigations 
   These recommendations are relatively innocuous for authorities and 
have perhaps the best chance of wide-ranging adherence in the relatively short term, 
enabling parties to be better informed, thereby reducing some of the uncertainty frequently 
cited as a major source of frustration for the parties.   
 
Merger investigations should be ‘conducted in a manner that promotes an effective, 
efficient, transparent and predictable merger review process’137 and should include 
opportunities for meetings or discussions between the parties and the authorities.138  
Where merger investigation proceeds through the initial stages into a more detailed, or 
‘second-stage’ inquiry, parties should be advised of why clearance was not given within 
the initial review period.139   These recommendations are designed both to increase 
transparency and identify, early, problematic issues for the parties which may facilitate 
faster resolution.140
                                            
135  In 2000 the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee noted the lack of transparency in merger review 
that existed at the time and claimed greater transparency would highlight differences, stimulate discussion and 
adjustments: ICPAC Report, above n 3, 4.   
136  This is clear from a recent ICN investigation of compliance which demonstrated that a substantial amount of 
important information was not yet readily available to the public: Implementation of the ICN Recommended 
Practices for Merger Notifciation and Review Procedures, above n 113, Annex B. 
137  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI(A). 
138  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI(B). 
139  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI(C).  Where the relevant jurisdiction has only one 
phase of investigation, ‘the competition agency should advise the merging parties of perceived competitive 
concerns as promptly as possible’: Working Group comment 1 to recommendation VI(C). 
140  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation VI(C). 
    While these would seem to be largely common sense 
recommendations, there are a number of jurisdictions which could not currently claim 
  Page 27 of 40 
The International Competition Network’s recommendations for multi-jurisdictional merger review procedures  
substantial adherence.  For those states the recommendations might provide an important 
catalyst for reform. 
 
It is also recommended that where there are no definitive deadlines relating to merger 
investigations, ‘procedures should be adopted to ensure that the investigation is completed 
without undue delay’141 and that agencies ‘avoid imposing unnecessary or unreasonable 
costs and burdens on merging parties’ in connection with merger investigations.142  The 
key difficulty with these recommendations are that the terms ‘undue delay’ and 
‘unnecessary or unreasonable costs and burdens’ are inherently subjective so that the 
parties’ views on what might be unreasonable are often far removed from those of the 
authorities.  Nevertheless, the recommendations might bring to light the importance of 
focussing on the task of determining whether the merger should be cleared or challenged 
rather than, as has been suggested in some jurisdictions, including the US, using the 
notification process as a means of gathering information for subsequent legal 
challenges.143  The working group suggests that requests for information focus on aspects 
of the transaction that raise potential competition concerns144 and parties should be 
permitted, where possible, to submit information in the manner in which they maintain the 
information in the ordinary course of their business.145  In this respect is also suggested 
that agencies be sensitive to the costs associated with full-text translations, should impose 
translation requirements only selectively and should consider ways to reduce the burden of 
translations wherever possible.146
                                            
141  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI(D). 
142  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI(E)  
143  Criticism has been levelled at a number of regimes, in particular the United States and European Union, that they 
unreasonably burden parties in their information requests; in particular, that their requests for information exceed 
that necessary to perform the task of assessing the legality of the proposed merger. 
144  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation VI(E). 
145  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation VI(E).. 
146  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 4 to recommendation VI(E). 
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Finally, it is recommended that investigations be conducted with ‘due regard for applicable 
legal privileges and related confidentiality doctrines’147 and transparent policies should 
also be put in place for the exchange of such information with other competition 
agencies.148
Procedural fairness 
 
 
Merging parties and third parties with a legitimate interest in a proposed merger should be 
afforded procedural fairness149 in the sense that they should be provided ‘with a 
meaningful opportunity to express their views.’150  Third parties should also be allowed to 
‘express their views’ during the review process.  Procedural fairness should apply equally 
to domestic and foreign firms.151  In addition, prior to an adverse finding parties should be 
advised sufficiently of the competitive concerns held by the agency and have a ‘meaningful 
opportunity’ to respond.152  This might result in amendments alleviating the competitive 
concern or the agreed imposition of conditions that would allow the merger to proceed 
while addressing the agency’s concerns.153  The agency responsible for review should 
ensure processes are ‘implemented fairly, efficiently, and consistently’.154  Finally, it is 
recommended that merger review systems ‘provide an opportunity for timely review by a 
separate adjudicative body’ on the merits’155 within a timeframe which would allow the 
merger to remain viable.156
                                            
147  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VI(F). 
148  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 3 to recommendation VI(F). 
149  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VII(A). 
150  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation VII(A). 
151  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 3 to recommendation VII(A) 
152  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VII(B) 
153  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 3 to recommendation VII(B). 
154  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VII(D) 
155  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation VII(E).  This applies only to adverse findings. 
156  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation VII(E). 
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Confidentiality 
It is recommended that information received by authorities from the merging parties and 
third parties in relation to the proposed merger ‘should be subject to appropriate 
confidentiality protections’.157  The need for a certain level of confidentiality in merger 
reviews to avoid prejudicing ‘important commercial interests’158 has long been recognised 
and has formed part of most bilateral competition agreements.  Confidentiality rules should 
balance commercial interests of the parties with the need to ‘ensure procedural fairness’159 
and the ‘public interest’ and the need for transparency in the review process.160   Where an 
agency determines that certain information will not be granted confidentiality status, parties 
should have the opportunity to contest that decision prior to disclosure of the 
information.161  In addition, agencies should ‘avoid unnecessary public disclosure of 
confidential information’.162
It is also recommended that agencies ‘seek to defer contacts with third parties until the 
proposed transaction becomes public’ where such deferral would not adversely affect the 
agency’s ability to investigate effectively or complete within applicable deadlines.
  
 
163
Interagency coordination 
 
 
This recommendation provides that agencies should ‘seek to coordinate their review of 
mergers that may raise competitive issues of common concern.’164
                                            
157  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IX(A). 
158  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation IX(A). 
159  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation IX(A).  See also 
recommendation IX(D), specifically stating that confidentiality rules should ‘strike an appropriate balance between 
protecting the confidentiality of third-party submissions and procedural fairness considerations.’ 
160  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation (A). 
161  Ibid. 
162  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IX(E). 
163  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation IX(C). 
164  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation X(A). 
  In particular, this is 
designed to reduce conflict and duplication and to avoid unnecessary delays and burdens 
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for parties and agencies.’165  Comments to this recommendation make clear that any 
interagency coordination is voluntary and in no way prejudices the rights of each agency to 
reach their own independent decisions.166
Finally, it is recommended that reviewing agencies ‘seek remedies tailored to cure 
domestic competitive concerns’ and seek to avoid inconsistency with the remedies in other 
jurisdictions.
   
 
167  This is a particularly important recommendation in the context of multi-
jurisdictional merger review where there is the potential for remedies to conflict, causing 
problems for the parties and friction between nations.168
Remedies 
 
 
The ICN has recently adopted new and relatively uncontroversial recommendations 
relating to remedies.  They first provide that any remedy should address the identified 
competitive harm arising from the proposed transaction.  While outright prohibition might 
be necessary to achieve this in some cases, the ICN recommendation provides that 
agencies should first consider alternative resolution, such as modifications to, or conditions 
placed on, the proposed transaction.   
 
Procedurally, this set of recommendations also calls for transparency in the ‘proposal, 
discussion and adoption of remedies’,169 procedures to ensure effective and easy 
administration of remedies170
                                            
165  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 2 to recommendation X(A). 
166  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 4 to recommendation X(A). 
167  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation X(E). 
168  The Working Group suggests that ‘competition agencies should invite the merging parties to consider 
coordinating and timing the substance of their remedy proposals’: ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, 
Working Group comment 1 on recommendation X(E). 
169  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XI(B). 
170  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XI(C). 
 and the provision of means to ensure ‘implementation, 
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monitoring of compliance, and enforcement of the remedy’.171  While incorporating more 
substantive (as opposed to purely procedural) components than other 
recommendations172
Competition Agency Powers 
 these are all appropriate and relatively free from controversy.   
 
The most recent set of recommendations adopted by the ICN relates to the powers of 
competition agencies to enforce merger laws.  The first in this set of recommendations 
simply (and reasonably) states that competition agencies ‘should have the authority and 
tools necessary for effective enforcement.’173  In particular, they must have ‘appropriate 
investigative tools and mechanisms’174 for obtaining relevant information and they ‘must 
have the ability to initiate enforcement actions … and to seek sanctions for non-
compliance’.175  Supplementary to this is the recommendation that agencies have 
sufficient staff and expertise to effectively discharge their responsibility176 and that they 
should have independence sufficient to ensure objective application and enforcement.177
                                            
171  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XI(D). 
172  In this respect the ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical Framework Subgroup presented a report on merger 
remedies at the 2005 ICN conference: Merger Remedies Review Project, Report for the fourth ICN annual 
conference, Bonn, June 2005 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/bonn/Mergers_WG/SG2_Analytical_Framework/Remedies_Stud
y.pdf> at 12 July 2005. 
173  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XII(A). 
174  Comment 1 to ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XII(A). 
175  Comment 2 to ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XII(A). 
176  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XII(B). 
177  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XII(C). 
 
 
There is, of course, a natural self-interest involved in a Network of competition agencies 
collectively recommending that their powers should, in most cases, be increased.  There 
are also likely to be substantially divergent views as to what constitutes the ‘authority and 
tools necessary’ for effective enforcement.  Consequently, it may prove difficult for many 
competition authorities to convince their governments that wider powers are necessary to 
conform with this recommendation. 
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Review of merger control provisions 
The final set of recommendations calls for the periodic review of merger control provisions 
and consideration of reforms promoting ‘convergence towards recognized best 
practices.’178   In addition to assisting convergence, it is important that the threshold levels 
for merger control be periodically reviewed to account for inflation or substantial changes 
in the market.179
The Need for Further Action 
  This is recognised, albeit briefly, by the working group in their comments 
to these recommendations which, if adopted, should see increased convergence of 
procedural requirements for merger review. 
 
The recommendations adopted by the ICN membership are positive in that they address 
most of the problems currently associated with multi-jurisdictional mergers.  However, as 
noted by Randy Tritell at the second annual conference, recommended practices are 
meaningful only if they are implemented.180
‘10 percent of responding jurisdictions have made changes to laws and regulations 
although some 30 percent have indicated that changes are planned or under 
consideration.’
  In this respect, the Merger Streamlining 
Group study of recommendations adopted at the first ICN conference concluded that fewer 
than 
 
181
                                            
178  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation XIII(A) and (B) (originally recommendation VII, then 
recommendation XI). 
179  For example, one of the criticisms of the United States is that its thresholds have not kept pace with inflation. 
180  See Fox and Janow, above n 47, 14. 
181  Ibid 33-34.  See further Rowley and Campbell, above n 80. 
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Nevertheless, the trend appears to be changing, albeit slowly.182  As indicated earlier the 
EU has recently changed its merger notification timing requirements so that they now 
adhere to the ICN recommendations and Australia has also made changes to reflect some 
of the ICN’s recommendations.183
One of the main barriers to change in response to the ICN recommendations is that many 
of the recommendations themselves are sufficiently vague that nations might honestly 
claim adherence by following the letter if not the spirit of the recommendations.
   
 
184  
Another, perhaps more important, limitation on the ICN’s recommendations is with the 
nature of the ‘agreement’ itself as simply a set of ‘recommendations’ with no binding force 
(so far as it is possible for a document to have ‘binding’ force in international law).  This is 
highlighted by the use of the word ‘should’ (as opposed to ‘must’) in almost all 
recommendations.  Consequently, the recommendations lack any potent force at 
governmental level.  Indeed, despite the adoption of these best practices, little substantial 
action has been taken by governments to give effect to their implementation.185
In the past, best practice recommendations have proved impotent in their attempts to bring 
about substantial change to the merger review processes to which multi-jurisdictional 
mergers are subjected.  The ICN recommendations seem more promising given the 
extensive and expanding membership and the increasing recognition that the current 
system is unsatisfactory for all concerned.  It is still too early to determine whether the 
  Thus, it is 
mainly in relation to those aspects of merger review within the purview of the relevant 
authorities that we have seen some real movement toward conforming with these best 
practices.   
 
                                            
182  See Implementation of the ICN Recommended Practices, above n 85, 2. 
183  See Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
[2004] OJ L 24/1 and ACCC, Guideline for Informal Merger Review, above n 109. 
184  See further, Fox and Janow, above n 47, 33. 
185  See further see Rowley and Campbell, above n 99.  Note that there are exceptions to this trend: Implementation 
of the ICN Recommended Practices, above n 85, 11. 
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ICN’s best practice recommendations will result in any meaningful change for parties and 
regulators or whether they will be relegated to the now extensive pile of “best practice” 
endeavours that have gone before.  It is suggested the latter is more likely after, perhaps, 
an initial period of positive rhetoric and modest change. 
 
Something more solid than a mere ‘recommendation’ is needed if there is to be meaningful 
reduction of the burdens associated with multijurisdictional merger review in the short 
term.  It is to this end that the following proposals are put forward. 
 
Proposals for further reform  
There is no single solution to the problems associated with multi-jurisdictional merger 
review.  Agreeing upon a common filing form, a set of best practices, a timetable for 
review, or a procedure for cross-border co-operation will not, in isolation, see an 
appreciable reduction in the regulatory burden.  On the other hand, it must also be 
accepted that not all problems or inefficiencies associated with international merger 
regulation can be overcome so long as a system of sovereign states remains.  This is not 
a cause for concern and remains the case for many areas of international private and 
public law.    
 
Substantive differences in merger review are likely continue for the foreseeable future and 
the nature of judicial review of mergers also varies between states.  For example, in some 
jurisdictions the regulator is the ultimate arbiter – in others the regulators play only an 
initial role and mergers are challenged in the courts or decided by government officials 
(ministers) who may have an overriding national interest reason for approving or declining 
a merger.  These differences reflect different administrative and judicial structures adopted 
by states and an overarching desire for countries to approve or block mergers which 
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positively or adversely, respectively, impact on their subject views of ‘national interest’ 
which can frequently change as a result of changes in government.  These problems are 
not, however, the cause of the most significant burdens for parties and regulators, and the 
fact that they cannot all be ‘solved’ should not deter endeavours to remedy those problems 
that can. 
 
A combination of endeavours is required if meaningful reform is to be achieved.  The 
following recommendations for reforms have the potential to be achieved in the relatively 
short term186
1. Common form for initial (stage 1) notification 
 and could, together, significantly alleviate the cost of multi-jurisdictional 
merger review for parties and regulators and other parties to whom the cost is passed on.  
Some have already been achieved, at least to a degree, through the ICN’s 
recommendations.  However, the first two suggestions, not fully accomplished by the ICN’s 
recommendations, are by far the most important and, without agreement or convergence 
on the other aspects, would themselves substantially reduce the regulatory burden 
currently experienced.   
 
2. Binding agreement on thresholds for notification  
a. Initial thresholds 
b. Additional nexus requirements for foreign-to-foreign mergers 
3. A binding agreement on timeframe for filing mergers  
4. Best practices agreement on timeframe for reviewing mergers 
5. Best practices agreement on transparency in merger review 
6. Best practices agreement on the facilitation of co-operation between Member 
States where notified multi-jurisdictional mergers raise competition concerns 
                                            
186  This is to be contrasted with calls for substantive harmonization which does not appear to be achievable in the 
short term and is not, in any event, necessarily a desirable outcome. 
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The first proposal for reform is the establishment of a common form for initial notification.  
This is made possible by the fact that there is often a ‘common core’ of information 
required by authorities to make an initial assessment on whether a merger is likely to raise 
competition concerns.  Despite this commonality a multitude of different forms and 
requirements currently impose significant and unnecessary transaction costs on parties.187  
A common notification form for initial filing is a sensible, meaningful and attainable 
response to the inefficiencies currently experienced by parties proposing to merge.188  At 
least in the initial phase of a merger investigation, the economic issues that arise are 
substantially similar in all jurisdictions,189 despite differences in substantive laws.  ICN 
member authorities have already accepted that informational requirements for initial 
notification be limited to that necessary to determine ‘whether the transaction raises 
competitive issues meriting further investigation’190 and that they ‘should elicit the 
minimum amount of information necessary to initiate the merger review process.’191
Where jurisdiction-specific information is required (such as domestic turnover) this could 
be incorporated by means of an annex for each of the jurisdictions
   
Consequently, for parties adhering to the ICN recommendations, a common form for the 
initial vetting process would be consistent with these objectives and at the same time 
result in a significant reduction in administrative burdens faced by parties to mergers and 
would also make cross-border consultation easier. 
 
192
                                            
187  OECD, Report on Notification of Transnational Mergers, above n 50, 2 and Davey and Barker, above n 3, 122. 
188  See, for example, J William Rowley and A Neil Campbell, ‘Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review – Is It Time for a 
Common Form Filing Treaty?’, < http://www.mcmillanbinch.com/Upload/Publication/Multi-
Jurisdictional%20Merger%20Review_with%20attach_April%201999.pdf> at 24 January 2005. 
189  PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 4, 26. 
190  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, recommendation V(A). 
191  ICN, Recommended Practices, above n 38, Working Group comment 1 to recommendation V(A). 
192  OECD, Report on Notification of Transnational Mergers, above n 50, 2.  See also Whish and Wood, above n 65.’ 
 in which notification 
is required.  This would allow for a common core of information to be provided in multiple 
jurisdictions while also facilitating the provision of domestically focussed information, thus 
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ensuring that countries receive the information necessary to determine potential domestic 
impact without losing the benefits of a common filing form.   
 
As the ICN has recognised, it is also important that burdens of translation be limited in the 
initial stages of an investigation, so that while the cost of translating a common core of 
information into multiple language requirements, where multiple jurisdictions are required 
to be notified, is a legitimate cost of doing business,193 it would be possible, and 
appropriate, to allow the majority of supporting documents to be annexed in the language 
of the business involved, provided summaries of each document are translated into the 
preferred language. 194
The second essential component of any reform endeavour is a binding threshold 
agreement.  While states have legitimate interest in pursuing a competitive climate that is 
best for their unique economy, and this might require different threshold levels for 
notification, an agreement requiring thresholds to be set at a level that reflected the 
potential for mergers to contravene the substantive law could provide an appropriate 
benchmark against which parties determined their thresholds.  Were this to form part of a 
binding treaty agreement between states then, despite the fact it does not prescribe the 
level of thresholds, governments could be held more accountable for the threshold tests 
that they adopt and could be required to regularly review threshold levels and/or put in 
   
 
A common filing form of the type proposed would provide meaningful relief to business 
burdened with multi-jurisdictional filings.  It would ensure that in most cases mergers 
unlikely to raise any serious competition concerns would be relieved from the burden of 
divergent and copious amounts of informational requirements at significant cost.   
 
                                            
193  Currently, in OECD jurisdictions alone, there are 19 different languages prescribed. 
194  See further ICPAC Report, above n 3, 16.  This would be consistent with ICN recommendations and already 
occurs in a number of jurisdictions. 
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place an automatic mechanism for updating the thresholds to ensure they kept pace with 
inflation and the changing economic climate. 
 
The next element of the proposed reform package is a binding agreement on timeframes 
for the filing of mergers.  In this respect the ICN’s existing recommendations are 
commendable.  It is suggested, however, that the prospect of these recommendations 
being applied in the long term would be significantly enhanced by their inclusion in a more 
formal document which would then permit parties to prepare and file in all necessary 
jurisdictions at the same time. 
 
In relation to the review of mergers by authorities, the ICN’s recommendations relating to 
timeframes, when combined with the associated working group comments, form an 
appropriate basis for a best practices agreement.  While formal agreement could, and 
should, be reached on a review period for the initial stages of investigation, the setting of 
specific time limits for review of mergers raising competition concerns is perhaps 
unattainable in the short term due, in part, to the different administrative and legal 
frameworks in which authorities operate.  Consequently, an agreement incorporating a set 
of non-binding and variable time frames, depending on size and complexity of the 
merger,195
 
 should be established to provide guidance to authorities and parties on 
appropriate time-frames for review.  The agreement should also mandate that authorities 
review and, where necessary, revise their timelines for review. 
 
Transparency is the next essential ingredient for effective reform.  In this respect, the  
ICN’s recommendations on transparency should be incorporated in a more formal 
document to improve accountability where transparency continues to be a problem. 
                                            
195  See ICPAC Report, above n 3, 14-15.  
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Finally, the increasing number of cross-border mergers necessitates effective co-
operation.196  To a degree this already occurs.  Significant discussion between many 
countries in relation to concerns over potentially anti-competitive multi-jurisdictional 
mergers is common.197  Less frequently, work-sharing may occur on a case-by-case 
basis.198  A focussed agreement on how to deal with multi-jurisdictional merger review, 
incorporating confidentiality procedures, would assist in facilitating timely dialogue 
between reviewing authorities.  Developing further, more specific disciplines to guide the 
review of mergers with significant transnational or spillover effects would also constitute a 
valuable means of reducing both the parties and the authorities’ burdens.199
Conclusion 
   
 
There is a need for convergence in the procedural regulation of international mergers.  The 
public funds currently spent scrutinising thousands of merger proposals that have little or 
no prosect of impacting on competition should be re-allocated.  Cost and time savings 
experienced by business might also be passed on to the community through either higher 
shareholder dividends or lower priced products.   
 
The ICN’s recommendations in relation to merger notifications and procedures represent 
an important step toward achieving this convergence.  They are, however, limited by their 
very nature as ‘recommendations’ and not more solid treaty obligations.  The ability of a 
vast number of competition authorities to develop and agree to these recommendations 
does, however, suggest that the time might be ripe for more formal endeavours to achieve 
procedural convergence in the regulation of multi-jurisdictional mergers. Formal agreement 
on procedural convergence is not only desirable, it is a realistic means by which the 
                                            
196  Davey and Barker, above n 3, 7. 
197  Ibid 24. 
198  See ICPAC Report, above n 3, 7-8:  
199  Ibid 4 
  Page 40 of 40 
The International Competition Network’s recommendations for multi-jurisdictional merger review procedures  
regulatory burden currently experienced might be mitigated.  The focus on procedural, 
rather than substantive, convergence means that countries need not abandon underlying 
goals of merger regulation. 
 
A more formalised agreement incorporating all or most of the ICN recommendations, 
combined with the proposals for further reform suggested in this paper would serve to 
significantly reduce the financial and time burdens and increase the certainty associated 
with international merger regulation. 
